Israel and Normalisation: Is a new Middle East order emerging?

Benjamin Netanyahu and Prince Mohammed Al Nahyan

The recent normalisation of ties between the UAE, Bahrain and Isra without doubt the most important event that has taken place in the Middle East this year, and a strong signal that the Middle East is moving into a different era of regionalpolitics. Yet for one reason or another the signing of the “Abraham Accords” has not felt as seismic an event as it probably should. This can be partially explained by the ubiquitous presence of the Coronavirus, and the impending US Presidential election, both of which have dominated the headlines in recent months. 

Author: Michael Stephens is an Associate Fellow at RUSI, and a Senior Fellow at FPRI.

More important is the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is simply not as central to regional and global security as it has been in years gone by. The outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the subsequent collapse of Syria, Yemen, Libya into multiyear civil wars have seen millions of (mostly young) Arabs fighting for justice and rights in their own nations. These problems have been made worse by countries across the region who have exploited state fragility to pursue their own agendas, often at the direct expense of regional rivals. Turkey, Iran, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel have been especially active, sponsoring armed proxies, undertaking military operations outside their borders, and using slanted media outlets to pursue agendas that are diametrically opposed. This has opened up rifts right across the region, breaking apart any supposed norms of consensus, be they Arab or Islamic unity. 

This breakdown of unity has been central to creating space for both the UAE and Bahrain to openly increase ties with Israel without fear of reprisal from other Arab states. Indeed rather than face harsh opprobrium from “brotherly” Arab countries there has been little in the way of push back, with the Arab League voting down a proposal to condemn normalisation. Ten years ago such a notion would have been unthinkable. 

Against the backdrop of global power shifts in which the US has begun to retreat from its hegemonic position in the Middle East, the normalisation of ties between some Arab states and Israel should be seen as part of a great rebalancing of power in the region. Previous models of political and military organisation, such as the Arab League, and the GCC have ceased to become effective, a fact that became clear during the darkest days of the Syrian civil war, and the dying embers of the 2011 Arab spring. As protests and conflict swept the region, many states made their own calculations as to how best to protect themselves from domestic instability, conflict and wider regional tensions. Countries began to pursue narrow agendas, often in contradictory fashion to neighbouring nations that had been allies leading to diplomatic ruptures and chaotic competition (particularly among the Gulf States). The competition between so many players, all with competing agendas made understanding regional order all but impossible.  

However as US retrenchment has begun leaving power vacuums across the region a pattern is beginning to form, to the extent that it is now possible to see three broad alliances in the Middle East emerging: 

The Axis of Resistance

First is The axis of Resistance led by Iran, which include elements in the Iraqi state, Syria, and pro Iranian elements in Lebanon such as Hezbollah and Amal. These actors can broadly be defined by their hostility to Israel, and deep distrust of the West. Western allies are seen as enabling colonialist powers which are to be resisted. The majority of actors in this grouping are connected to Shia Islam.  

The Anti-Axis Powers

Secondly are The anti-axis powers, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. All three maintain strong relationships to the West and its defence institutions. They are deeply hostile to Iran and its allies, viewing them as fomenters of instability and discord. They also harbour a deep dislike for political Islamist movements that are active across the region, seeing Turkey and Qatar as troublemakers who do not sufficiently oppose Iran, and who look to overturn the established order.  

The Entente Cordiale

Thirdly the Entente Cordiale of Turkey and Qatar, (with allies such as the GNA of Libya and Hamas in Gaza). These powers maintain close ties to Western capitals, and are regular users of Western defence equipment, and have a position on Israel that is tolerant albeit more supportive of the Palestinians. However, this alliance maintains a workable if frosty relationship with Iran, and has become a die–hard opponent of the anti-axis powers, blocking their goals across the region through military and financial means by frequently backing actors are sympathetic to political Islam. 

The emergence of these three alliances is a neo-realist’s dream, in the face of decaying regional hegemony states in the region have begun to compete, with smaller regional players teaming up with larger more powerful players to create balances of power. A neo-realist might further argue that the formation of these power structures will lead to a form of stability as the three axes cancel each other out.  

There is some sense to this argument, the chance of any of these three axes going to war with each other is low, and each axis has strengths that the other two lacks. The resistance axis has managed to penetrate local politics and militaries in weak states in such an effective way that its influence cannot be removed. The anti-axis powers have access to the highest end military technology and ample financial resources, all backstopped by a nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile the Entente Cordiale has the sheer weight and power of a major NATO military force, backed up by the enormous wealth and fiscal resources of Qatar.  

The three axes will compete, most fiercely in weaker states whose leaders are unable to resist the lure of weapons and financing. It is certain to exacerbate instability and ensure continued tension in the region for many years to come, but most likely ensure that no further escalation occurs. This is the new order of things in the Middle East, and it is likely to stay this way for years to come.  

 

 

The views in this article represent those of the Author alone; not CHACR, the Army or the MOD.https://chacr.org.uk/2020/10/30/israel-and-normalisation-is-a-new-middle-east-order-emerging/


Israel may be threatened by Iran no matter who wins election

This could leave Israel in grave danger both on the nuclear front and regarding ongoing attempts by Tehran to extend its Shi’ite crescent over the Middle East.

IRANIAN PRESIDENT Hassan Rouhani (right) and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. Who wanted to pay the price of moral action to truly stop Iran? (photo credit: DANISH SIDDIQUI/ REUTERS)
IRANIAN PRESIDENT Hassan Rouhani (right) and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. Who wanted to pay the price of moral action to truly stop Iran?
(photo credit: DANISH SIDDIQUI/ REUTERS)
While there are major official policy differences on Iran between US President Donald Trump and US Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden, Israel may be in danger no matter who wins Tuesday’s election.

Both politicians, for different reasons, may be ready to cut a deal with the Islamic Republic that may only be cosmetically better than the 2015 nuclear deal.
This could leave Israel in grave danger both on the nuclear front and regarding ongoing attempts by Tehran to extend its Shi’ite crescent over the Middle East.
True, one version of the stakes is that Trump has kept pressure on Iran since May 2018, and only the threat of four more years of him will get the Islamic Republic to agree to new limits on their nuclear program and adventurism in the region.
In this version of the contrast between the candidates, Biden is expected to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran as long as it returns to compliance with the deal. This would keep Tehran from a nuclear weapon until 2025 or 2030 but leave the same holes in the deal as there have been all along.
The other version of the situation is that Trump has said he will cut a deal within four weeks of the election. It is nearly impossible to see the ayatollahs agreeing to major new concessions within four weeks.
This is doubly true since Iran has its own presidential election coming up in June, when the most anti-West factions of the country are expected to gain even more power.
Further, the seeming rush to cut a deal is not a flash in the pan for Trump.
Many Iran watchers were deeply concerned that Trump was ready to cut a deal with the Islamic Republic in September 2019, with only cosmetic differences form the 2015 deal, if only Iran President Hassan Rouhani would agree to a photo op at the UN. There were also multiple instances in which Trump tried to get Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to meet with him.
By some counts, the Trump administration attempted almost a dozen quiet diplomatic openings with the Islamic Republic even as the president made threatening speeches in public.
Former Trump national security adviser John Bolton also refers to trying to run interference at numerous times when Trump would have been ready to prematurely cut a new deal with the ayatollahs.
In contrast, some of Biden’s advisers have said he would only rejoin the nuclear deal if there were substantive new concessions.
Iran may also give Biden a longer window to decide his policy than Trump, who they are already furious with.
They may feel they have a chance with Biden that is not worth ruining with putting him under early pressure as he tries to get a handle on the coronavirus crisis.
Some of Biden’s advisers also think he can do better at rallying Europe and then other world powers to pressure Iran to make concessions. But this could also be wishful thinking.
Neither Trump nor Biden seem serious about emphasizing the military option of striking Iran’s nuclear program, a threat that was part of what brought Tehran to make concessions leading to the 2015 nuclear deal.
More than all of the above, neither Trump nor Biden want to spend much time or political capital on a further extended standoff with Iran. They have the coronavirus crisis, racial divisions, law and order, China, Russia and other issues that are much more pressing and where they would like to invest their energies.
Biden has barely talked about the issue during the campaign, and at times it has seemed that Trump cared more about generally looking tough and undoing the 2015 deal because it was part of former president Barack Obama’s legacy than he did about securing concrete concessions from Iran.
Trump’s maximum-pressure sanctions campaign has succeeded in reducing some of the financial support and footprint of Iran’s proxies in the Middle East. But there are no signs that it is close to getting the regime to crack.
Whoever is elected president on Tuesday, Israel will need to keep a watchful eye. It will need to try to influence policy to keep the Islamic Republic under wraps and be ready to act robustly in self-defense if the security situation becomes more dangerous.