Mr Blinken, only when history precedes politics,

Alex Rose , Mar 29 , 2021 11:25 AM

 

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken

State Department Photo by Freddie Everett

“In my many years I have come to a conclusion that one useless man is a shame, two is a law firm, and three or more is a congress.” [John Adams]

 

At the outset, we learn the following from the Jerusalem Center of Public Affairs in answer to the question, ‘Who are the Palestinians?’;

 

 Palestinian leaders claim that the Palestinians are descended from the Canaanite people who lived in the Land of Canaan before the Israelite tribes settled in it.

 

 What is the source of the name “Palestine?” It is not Arab; it is derived from the name “Palestina,” by which the Roman Emperor Hadrian chose to call the land after the defeat of the Bar Kokhba Revolt in 135 CE. His aim was to erase “Judea.”

 

 According to Palestinian historian Muhammad Y. Muslih, during the entire 400 year period of Ottoman rule (1517-1918), before the British set up the 30-year-long Palestine Mandate, “There was no political unit known as Palestine.” In Arabic, the area was known as al-Ard al-Muqadassa (the holy land), or Surya al-Janubiyya (southern Syria), but not Palestine.

 

 Not a single Palestinian tribe identifies its roots in Canaan; instead, they all see themselves as proud Arabs descended from the most notable Arab tribes of the Hejaz, today’s Iraq, or Yemen. Even the Kanaan family of Nablus locates its origins in Syria. Some Palestinian clans are Kurdish or Egyptian in origin, and in Mount Hebron, there are traditions of Jewish origins.

 

Mr. Blinken, only when history precedes politics, can any progress follow. On 05/12/, 2015, the Jerusalem Post published Daniel Grynglas’ “Debunking the claim that ‘Palestinians’ are the indigenous people of Israel.”It serves as a good starting point to an understanding how so many “useful idiots” in the US State Department have failed in their endeavors to comprehend Jewish claims to the Land of Israel.

 

Mr Grynglas will take us back to the year 1831. The wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors were fought for many years on the battlefield between armies. In recent decades the arena of conflict has shifted from hand-to-hand combat to a war of narratives.

 

Everybody agrees that the current affluence of Israel, its modern infrastructure and economy were developed by the Jews. The Palestinian Arab narrative is that as the ancient, indigenous people of Palestine they feel dispossessed and they deserve to take over Israel’s riches. Jewish claims to our heritage in the Land of Israel are supported by abundant archaeological artifacts and historical records.

 

As one of many examples, the Dead Sea Scrolls, a collection of Jewish texts found in desert caves in the West Bank, near Qumran in the 1940’s and 1950’s, date from the 3rd century B.C. to the1st century A.D. They include the earliest known copies of biblical texts and documents, outlining the beliefs of a little understood Jewish sect.

 

As recently as March16, 2021, the Israel Antiquities Authority displayed newly discovered Dead Sea Scroll fragments at the Dead Sea scrolls conservation lab in Jerusalem, They announced discovery of dozens of new Dead Sea Scroll fragments, bearing a biblical text found in a desert cave and believed hidden during a Jewish revolt against Rome approximating to 1,900 years ago. [The Associated Press].

 

In October, 2019, a 5,000 year old city, the largest in ancient Israel, was exposed in the Sharon Valley. This was consequent to widespread excavations at the En Esur [Ein Asawir] archeological site, located near Wadi Ara, a major artery that stretches from Hadera to Afula, the northern Sharon valley, revealed a planned city from the Bronze Age. An even earlier settlement, dating to the Chalcoithic period [7,000 years ago], was uncovered in deeper excavations made beneath the city’s houses.

 

There are no records to support the “Palestinian” narrative. In history, art and literature there is no trace at all of any Muslim people referred to by anybody as “Palestinians.”In the midst of various arguments, what has been overlooked is a simple and incontrovertible way to prove that the vast majority of “Palestinians” are the descendants of the relatively recent Arab immigrants.

 

The claim that “Palestinians” are the indigenous people of Israel and that most of the present Palestinian Arabs have lived in these lands since time immemorial is a total fraud.

 

When Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt ruled in Gaza, prior to the Six Day War, there was no mention of “Palestinians”. This was simply because they were yet to be invented.

 

We first hear of Arabs referred to as “Palestinians” when Egypt’s President Nasser, with help from the Russian KGB, established the “Palestine Liberation Organization” in 1964. It was only during the 1970s that the newly minted “Palestinians” began to promote their narrative through murder and assassination. The Arabs have justified their attacks as acts of the indigenous people struggling for national liberation.

 

We are reminded by Daniel Swindell that “The Arabs used to chant that Palestine did not exist”. He notes that before the Arabs began to chant, “From the River to the Sea, Palestine Will be Free, ” they used to chant that Palestine did not exist. In 1872, Jerusalem was made into an independent administration. It reported directly to Istanbul, rather than Damascus. The district encompassed Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa, Beersheba, and Gaza. During the late Ottoman period, the Sanjak of Jerusalem, with the Sanjak of Akka [Acre] and the Sanjak of Nablus formed what was referred to as “Southern Syria.”

 

In 135 CE, the Romans renamed the region of Judea to “Palestine”. This move was obviously to eliminate Jewish inheritance. In 1936, the Peel Commission met with the General Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, Awni Abd al-Hadi, who testified, “There is no such country as Palestine. “Palestine” is a term the Zionists invented. There is no Palestine in the Bible. Our country was for centuries part of Syria. “Palestine” is alien to us . It is the Zionists who introduced it.”

After Israel was created, the Arabs switched tactics to claim that Palestine had always existed as a separate territory, but it had always belonged to the Palestinians. Really? Returning to Daniel Grynglas, before the State of Israel was born, the term “Palestinians” was used by the Jews to refer to themselves and their organizations. “The Palestine Post”, the Palestine Foundation Fund, Palestine Airways, and the Palestine Symphony Orchestra were all purely Jewish enterprises.

From the 1937 Peel Commission Report, records show that it was 19th and 20th century Jewish settlement and the resulting employment opportunities that drew successive waves of Arab immigrants to Palestine. “The Arab population shows a remarkable increase ….. partly due to the import of Jewish capital into Palestine and other factors associated with the growth of the [Jewish] National Home”

Further, “..in the Jewish settlement Rishon l’Tsion founded in 1882, by the year 1889, the forty Jewish families settled there, had attracted more than four hundred Arab families…. Many other Arab villages had sprouted in the same fashion.”

British PM Winston Churchill said in 1939: “.. far from being persecuted, the Arabs have crowded into the country [Palestine]..”

A useful background to earlier times is recorded in Think-Israel of July-August 2007. Written by Avi Goldreich, it is titled, “A Tour Of Palestine: The Year is 1696. It alludes to an author Adrian Reland [1676-1718], a Dutch Orientalist, born in Ryp, who studied at Utrecht and Leiden, was professor of Oriental languages successively at Harderwijk [1699] and Utrecht [1701].

He was a real scholar, geographer, cartographer and well known philologist, spoke perfect Hebrew, Arabic and ancient Greek, as well as European languages . His book was written in Latin. In 1695 he was sent on a sightseeing tour to Israel, at that time known as Palestina. In his travels he surveyed approximately 2500 places where people lived that were mentioned in the bible or Mishnah. His research method was interesting.

He first mapped the Land of Israel Secondly, Relandi identified each of the places mentioned in the Mishnah or Talmud along with their original source. If the source was Jewish, he listed it together with the appropriate sentence in the Holy Scriptures. If the source was Roman or Greek he presented the connection in Greek or Latin. Thirdly, he also arranged a population survey and census of each community.

His most prominent conclusions

1. Not one settlement in the Land of Israel has a name that is of Arabic origin. Most of the settlement names originate in the Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Roman languages. In fact, till today, except for Ramlah, not one Arabic settlement has an original Arabic name.

2. Most of the land was empty, desolate, and the inhabitants few in number and mostly concentrate in the towns Jerusalem, Acco, Tzfat, Jaffa, Tiberius and Gaza. Most of the inhabitants were Jews and the rest Christians. There were few Muslims, mostly nomad Bedouins. Nablus, known as Shchem, was exceptional, where approximately 120 people, members of the Muslim Natsha family and approximately 70 Shomronites, lived.

3. The book totally contradicts any post-modern theory claiming a “Palestinian heritage,” or Palestinian nation. The book strengthens the connection, relevance, pertinence, kinship of the Land of Israel to the Jews and the absolute lack of belonging to the Arabs, who robbed the Latin name Palestina and took it as their own.

On January 7, 2017, Richard Mather posted his “So-called Palestinians have no history in Israel, except as terrorists.” His introductory comments are very pointed. “Until it is acknowledged by the UN and other bodies that the Jewish people and not the Arabs are the indigenous inhabitants of Eretz Israel, it is going to be difficult to break the impasse of anti-Jewish prejudice that is the real obstacle to peace.”

Further, he says “all the evidence points to the conspicuous absence of Arab culture in late 17th century Palestine; and even in the 18th and 19th centuries the Arab inhabitants were not indigenous but were latecomers. This explains why, historically, Arabs never talked about Palestinian identity – because there wasn’t one. They were Egyptian, Syrian, Moroccan, Iraqi and Ottoman Arabs, and many of them expressed allegiance to the concept of a Greater Syria.”

In May-June 2008, Think-Israel released a master piece in history, “Tsafir Ronen’s, “Hadrian’s Curse – The invention of Palestine” The summary speaks volumes. It addresses the invention of “Palestine” as a psychological weapon for conquering Eretz Yisrael. It recalls almost 2,000 years ago when the Roman Emperor Hadrian cursed the Jewish People and decreed that Judea should be henceforth called “Palestine”, after the Philistines, an ancient enemy of Israel that had disappeared from the world’s stage more than 600 years earlier. It was his final twist of the knife and legacy after wars, massacres, persecutions and exiles that had largely extinguished presence from Judea.

Let us recall that in 1977, a member of the PLO leadership, Zahir Muhsein, the leader of the al-Sa’iqa Organization, revealed the truth in an interview with the Dutch newspaper,Trouw:

“The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a ‘Palestinian’ state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct ‘Palestinian people’ to oppose Zionism for tactical reasons.”

The name “Palestine” is not a country, but a geographic region. Ronen asks the question, “Will it be precisely the Israeli government that will resurrect Hadrian’s curse, previously lost in the depths of forgetfulness?” The inheritors of power, Obama and Biden may think so, but we have history and international law on our side., if only the Israeli Authorities would develop the intelligence to utilize them.

Finally, we have a real human being, who lost his beautiful daughter to “Palestinian” terrorists, Stephen M. Flatow, writing a paper in JNS entitled, “We need another Reagan plan for Israel” He recalls President Ronald Reagan who denounced his predecessor , the peanut farmer Jimmy Carter, for undermining Israel’s control of Jerusalem. Quoting directly from Reagan:

“Israel and Jordan are the two Palestinian states envisioned and authorized by the United States,” Reagan said. “Jordan is now recognized as sovereign in some 80 percent of the old territory of Palestine.” Consequently, ” the Palestinian Arab refugee issue could be solved through assimilation in Jordan, designated by the U.N. as the Arab-Palestinian state.”

The British Mandate for Palestine, as decreed by the League of Nations in 1920 (and subsequently endorsed by the United States), treated the entire territory as a single, indivisible unit. In 1922, the British created the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan on approximately 78% of Palestine.

At the end of the day, we can demonstrate that we never left i.e. the Jews continuous presence in the Land of Israel is a reality. We must dispel lies that Israel stole “Palestinian” land and draw attention to The British betrayal over Trans-Jordan. The wording, “postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local condition is by the nature of the wording a temporary action. That action was only valid until there was a change in the conditions leading to that decision. It did not authorize the British to permanently cut off portions of the land and turn it over to a foreign people.


Former fighter pilot Maj. Gen. Tal Kalman, who heads the IDF’s Iran Directorate, says that dealing with the challenges the Islamic republic poses for Israel is a delicate and complex mission, but one the IDF is more than capable of handling.
By Yoav Limor Published on 03-29-2021 12:23 Last modified: 03-29-2021 12:29
‘Israel has the ability to completely destroy Iran’s nuclear program’
“The Iranian people pay a very heavy price for the regime’s interest in nuclear capability,” says Maj. Gen. Tal Kalman | Photo: Eric Sultan

The past year was very good security-wise. The low number of attacks and victims gave Israelis a relatively high feeling of security, and the intensive focus on coronavirus (and elections) pushed aside other issues that in normal times would have made headlines.

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But the security challenges are here to stay. The new government, when it is formed, will not be able to avoid them, and top of the list is Iran. Behind the scenes, preparations are already underway for these marathon discussions, which take place mainly within the IDF, and specifically in the new unit formed last year to deal with Iran and strategic issues – the Strategy and Third-Circle Directorate.

The man heading this unit, Tal Kalman, is one of the most-cautious generals in the General Staff, and his statements here, in his first and exclusive interview, portray exactly the threats and possible responses – including military – but also hold a warning: to avoid dealing with these problems could pose a strategic threat for Israel.

Kalman says 2020 was a good year for the battle against Iran. “I don’t want to call it a turning point year, but it was a year of major changes.” It began with the killing of Qassem Suleimani, and continued with “a sequence of events that I mostly can’t elaborate on, which made the balance positive, even very positive.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visits the Bushehr nuclear facility (AP via the Iranian Presidency Office/File)
Q: And yet, Iran is far from surrendering.

“Iran is not a specific operational challenge, but a challenge one level above the military. It is a challenge for our national security doctrine. We had a tendency to be cynical in recent years, due to the idea that Iran is being pushed into the discussion for other things, but I really think this is about dealing with a country with the potential to become a regional power, headed by an extreme regime with a real goal of destroying Israel.

Dealing with Iran, he says, is based on four components. The first is the extreme regime, “that as long as it rules Iran, Israel will have a major challenge.” The second is the nuclear issue. The third is the military strengthening “which is close to that of a regional power.” And the fourth is the Iranian attempt to grow its regional influence “that in the long run uses areas with lack of governance and establishes capabilities there.”

The challenge that all these pose for Israel is unprecedented. “The standard components of deterrence, defeat and defense are irrelevant for a country of 80 million people that are hundreds of miles away. This is a long-term strategic competition that calls on us to deploy a different kind of thinking than the one used for tackling a country on our border.”

Q: Explain.

“For a country on our border, I build up the force, prepare for war, sometimes act to thwart threats, and I keep a very large intelligence hold , with the aim of bringing about defeat in war. With Iran, it’s not about defeat. It’s a competition. And therefore the components that need to be dealt with are not only military. They’re also military, but also diplomatic, economic, conscientious, and more. That’s how big the challenge is.”

Q: Can Iran be defeated?

“When you’re in a strategic competition with a state, you’re not concerned about defeat. What you try to achieve is supremacy at any given point in time, supremacy that will give significant deterrence that will give you security and deter the other side from acting against you.”

Q: And yet, Jerusalem and Washington had hoped for defeat – that the regime would collapse under the sanctions.

“A strategic competition is not about thinking about tomorrow morning, but long term. It requires synchronizing all the national efforts, some of which are not managed by the IDF, but rather other bodies. Israel has room for improvement in this area.”

This is precisely the process that Kalman has been advancing this past year. Together with the Mossad, the Foreign Ministry, the Atomic Energy Commission and other bodies, an orderly process is taking place, which will eventually submit to the state leadership a doctrine of how to deal with Iranian challenge in the long term, and will subsequently bring about the synchronization of all the national efforts “which were not always synchronized in the past.”

Q: What have you already learned?

“We understood that we need to deal with all the components of the problem. You can’t just look at the nuclear, or just at the military, or just at the regional. You need to deal with everything. These past years we were very focused on the nuclear, which is of course on top because there’s a difference in dealing with a nuclear Iran to a non-nuclear one.”

The Iranian regime is interested in nuclear capability, he says, first of all to secure its stability. But for Israel, this is an existential issue, and it will be a different Middle East, entering a nuclear arms race where other countries can join Iran and attempt to achieve nuclear capabilities.”

Q: Who?

“I presume many of the countries around us will attempt to achieve nuclear capability. Certainly those with the economic capability.”

Q: Saudi Arabia? The Emirates? Egypt? Turkey?

“All these countries are candidates, yes. They are worried about Iran as much as we are.”

As opposed to public belief, Kalman thinks the Israeli strategy in the past 30 years actually worked, and the proof is that Iran still has no nuclear capability. The way to continue to delay this aspiration in the future is to make it understand that the price it pays is heavy. “The Iranian people pay a very heavy price for the regime’s interest in nuclear capability. But I believe this is not an Israeli problem, but one for the whole international community.”

Therefore, he believes, during negotiations, Israel needs to focus only on the nuclear issue, and not additional issues. “When speaking of nuclear capability, you should only talk about that and not about other regional issues and military reinforcement. It’s not right to push all those issues into the deal.”

Q: Why?

“Because the nuclear issue is the number one threat, and we have to achieve the maximum on that one. With all the rest we’ll know how to deal. It’s not that we’re not asking the international community to deal with those as well, but there’s a clear priority. First of all: nuclear capability.”

A Sayad missile fired from the Talash missile system during an air defense drill at an undisclosed location in Iran (AFP via the Iranian Army)
Kalman is also very concerned about the conventional military strengthening of Iran, which is “a discussion we’re missing out on.” It’s not about tanks and artillery, mostly long-range missiles and rockets, many of them precise, cruise missiles, drones, advanced aerial defense weapon systems that could challenge the Israeli air force and more. “Iran doesn’t only produce for itself. It supplies its subordinates with precise capabilities, with cruise missiles, with aerial defense systems to deal with Israeli air force capabilities. What’s made in Iran doesn’t stay in Iran. It’s immediately found in Syria, Lebanon, and maybe later on in Gaza.”

‘The military option is always there’
Kalman believes that Israel can influence what the deal with Iran will look like. The way to do that is through dialogue with the new US administration, which is already underway. Earlier this month there was a comprehensive discussion between the sides, led by the National Security Council, in which Kalman and his people took part. “The first stage is to be aligned with them on the intelligence picture. The Iranian nuclear program in 2021 is not the same program that existed when the deal was signed in 2015.”

Q: And they agree with us?

“I think that in very high percentages they see the situation as we do.”

Q: And can you understand the fear in Israel, based on the fact that these are the same people who were involved with making the deal last time?

“It’s true that in some of the cases these are the same people, but it’s not the same administration. So far, this administration is keeping its promises. It has come to listen, not rush to a new deal. So, I think there’s a space of a few months to try and influence the administration’s policy. Even the Americans are clearly saying they will not allow Iran to achieve nuclear capability. Now, the question is how to act in this situation.”

Q: What should Israel be demanding?

“I can’t go into detail, but basically we’re saying ‘yes’ to a deal that will be longer and stronger.”

Q: What do you say to those who think Iran is closer to the bomb than it was under the deal?

“As we see it, the actions Iran has taken are reversible, and were made to signal the international community to ‘hold us back and come back to the deal.’ It’s not that Iran has run away and headed towards a bomb. Furthermore, if the deal still existed, the Iranian issues wouldn’t be on the agenda. Under Biden’s national security doctrines, the Middle East is in fourth or fifth place. The US is looking at other regions and doesn’t want to invest as much in ours. Leaving the deal actually left the Iranian issues on the agenda very clearly.”

Kalman believes that the chances that Iran has secret components in its nuclear program are very low. “We have great intelligence and cooperation, but since it’s already happened to us once – our strategy needs to be that it can happen to us again. I can assure you that the utmost efforts and means are invested in surveillance and to be prepared so we are not surprised, but since I can’t foresee the future, and presuming this is indeed an existential threat for Israel that we can’t tolerate, we need also relevant military tools.”

Q: Let’s discuss the military option.

“I’ve been dealing with this for 25 years. I know the plans from the tactical level to the systemic and strategic level where I am today. For the past decades, it was always in gear, during the first years of the deal the level of attention to this dropped somewhat, but over the past year we’re back in fourth-fifth gear.”

Q: So one should ask if Israel has the ability to militarily thwart Iran’s nuclear plan. To attack and completely destroy it, like in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007.

“The answer is yes. When we build these capabilities, we build them to be operational. It’s not that there aren’t many strategic dilemmas, since the day after Iran can go back to the plan, but the ability exists. Definitely.”

An Israeli Air Force F-35 Lightning II fighter jet in action (AFP/Jack Guez/File)
A military threat, he believes, should be part of the strategic components. This is the message that Israel is sending in its dialogue with the US and Europe. “We don’t want to use it. Maybe when I was young I did, but today I understand it must be the final resort. We need to reach a solution in other ways, diplomatically, and I think there’s a chance for that, but this tool is also important. The Iranian regime is looking at this long-term, strategically, and is cautious and calculated. We already said that for them the nuclear bomb is an insurance policy, so if they understand it could endanger them – they’ll think again.”

While Israel is building capability to attack Iran, he says, the path forward is through cooperation. “Without being pompous, over the past two years we’ve seen dramatic changes in cooperation with our allies, mainly the US We have a relationship that has reached high intimacy. There were operations in the past year where things happened that never did before, from intelligence cooperation to operational cooperation. It happens because the Americans understand the shared interest in restraining the Iranian challenge in the Middle East.”

Q: Many in the defense community believe that instead of fighting the Iranians on our border, we should move the battle to their territory.

“One of the conclusions in the process we’re doing now is that we need to strengthen that component in the set of actions we’re doing.”

Kalman very much believes that the normalization agreements with the Gulf states do exactly that. “I think the Iranian leader, whose strategy is to base Iran on Israel’s borders, wakes up these days and is very concerned, because he sees potential for Israel to be based around his own borders. It’s a major change.”

Q: And military activity?

“Moving part of the activity to areas outside of Israel is part of the issue. There’s no doubt it’s a right tool, we’ll have to figure out how to develop it.”

Q: That means that if things explode on our border, Iran won’t be able to sit quietly back at home?

“We need to develop such tools. Definitely. When you’re competing against an intelligent, strategic actor who plays long term, you need to act to influence his intentions. For that you need to act also in other places and in other ways.”

In order to win this competition, he warns, you need to build force. “For the civilians, the security situation is basically good, and Iran is far away, but since this is a challenge to our national defense doctrine, we need to deal with it and we need to build a stable force that will last for many years and will not depend on any kind of agreements.”

Q: And what will you say to the Minister of Finance who will come a minute after elections and demand cuts?

“I’ll explain the whole picture, and say that in order to invest in other areas that are important like education and health and social services you need security stability, and in order to get that you need budgetary stability for the defense establishment. When you work in sprints, everything is much more expensive. When you plan long term and spread it out over the years, you can do things more intelligently and at lower costs.”

Israel facing a ‘security paradox’
Kalman, 52, is married and the father of three. In 2018 he was appointed head of the Strategic Division in the IDF Planning Directorate, and last year was appointed head of the new division responsible for Iran and Strategy. He continues to fly and is considered a leading candidate for commander of the Israeli Air Force, a nomination coming up next year.

He believes that despite the Israeli attacks in Syria, where Israel is trying to prevent Iran from establishing itself and the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, Iran has not dropped the dream of a foothold, yet it finds it difficult to do since Suleimani’s death. “They’re looking for other ways. There’s a learning competition between us all the time.”

Q: Is there any way to make them give up?

“They’re in a different place than what they thought they’d be, and this made them dramatically change their plans. But this isn’t a one-two year campaign, and not even four. This is a long-term event.”

Q: What needs to happen for them to give up?

“Just like with the nuclear bomb, the solution is not only military. The attacks are only one part of the strategy, but there needs to be a diplomatic component that is missing now. Assad is very dependent on the Iranians economically, and we are thinking about how to bring Syria to the end of its civil war without Iran being there. It’s a complicated event that needs to be managed between the powers.”

Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, Feb. 25, 2019 (AP via the Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/File)
One of the main threats on his table is the rockets and missiles that can hit targets with precision of just a few meters, and therefore pose a strategic threat on the high-profile facilities and strategic assets of Israel. Iran is dealing with this issue intensively in recent years and is spreading capabilities to its subordinates, mainly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

“There is this tendency, which is wrong, to speak of these precision missiles and Hezbollah in the same sentence,” he says. “It’s much more widespread and worrying. We’re speaking of a technological trend that has become fairly simple and available to all those around us. Israel is a small state and the precision capability on a small country is a threat we define as a grave strategic threat, one below a nuclear bomb. What many don’t understand is that it’s not just Hezbollah. It’s what’s being built in Syria, and maybe in the future in the Palestinian arena, and in Iraq and Yemen, and of course in Iran itself. It’s a very challenging puzzle.”

Q: What you’re saying is that if there’s a war in the north, your working assumption is that we’ll have to deal with precise weapons firing on us from every place in the region.

“Correct. We’re not just talking about a battle in the north, but a battle in the Northeast arena.”

Therefore, he says, the decision to initiate a preemptive strike in Lebanon against Hezbollah’s precision project is complicated, since it could lead to regional war. “We constantly discuss this, and look for ways to deal with the problem in all its dimensions – including the producer, in Iran.”

Q: Israel needs to define red lines that it will not cross?

“Defining red lines is very problematic.”

Q: Why? You defined red lines when it comes to the nuclear issue.

“Red lines tend to rub out. Israel knows how to respond to complicated challenges, and I believe that with our technology and capability we’ll know how to respond to this complicated challenge. But as I said, it’s not just Hezbollah but a wider regional problem, which must be part of our strategic discussions with the Americans and others, because nobody in the world is dealing with it. They talk about nuclear bombs, chemical weapons, but nothing about the precision weapons, and this must become part of the discussion.”

Q: Let’s talk about the upcoming elections in the Palestinian arena.

“This is an event we’re watching closely. Israel has decided not to interfere in the elections in the Palestinian Authority, but we are definitely concerned with the Hamas strengthening in Judea and Samaria. The message we passed on to all we speak to, and to the PA itself, is that this is a very dangerous route and it is risky for them.”

Q: What is Israel’s interest?

“Strengthening of Hamas in Judea and Samaria is a difficult blow to Israel’s interest, and to Israeli security. Definitely.”

Q: What is Israel’s interest in Gaza?

“We’re managing an interim strategy in Gaza, where we have yet to define for ourselves what the desired solution is for us long term. As of now Hamas rules the Strip, and our interest is for it to be weakened, restrained, deterred and limited in its capability to strengthen militarily, but simultaneously to keep the humanitarian and economic situation in the Strip reasonable.”

Q: That’s not a strategic plan. That’s crisis management.

“That’s the current policy, a policy that has succeeded to prevent quite a few crises over the past year and a half.”

Q: But is it good for Israel that Hamas rules Gaza?

“These are discussions we have to have with the state leadership. There can be a long-term situation where Hamas rules Gaza, but that means it will need to change. To recognize Israel. Fatah went through this process many years ago. The probability that Hamas will do this is not very high.”

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To sum up, he says, Israel is in a “security paradox.” On the one hand it is very strong and enjoys strategic supremacy, but on the other hand the threats against it have gotten worse. “We’re credited for the security, the daily quiet, but it is our duty to also look long term. There is no doubt that 2020 ended in a very positive strategic balance for Israel.”

Q: And how will 2021 end?

“I think that if we succeed in signing a few more normalization agreements we’ll have potential for a different Middle East, and as always be very dependent on the dynamics versus Iran. If we succeed in getting the international community on board for a longer and stronger nuclear deal, we’ll be in a very positive situation.”


The US is withdrawing militarily and disengaging diplomatically.

A U.S. Marine observes an Iranian fast attack craft from USS John P. Murtha during a Strait of Hormuz transit, Arabian Sea off Oman, in this picture released by U.S. Navy on July 18, 2019
(photo credit: REUTERS)
For the past century and a half, the Middle East has been a chess board of big powers. Every country, every movement, every entity in the region had to align with one of the superpowers of the day in order to survive. First there were France and Britain and later the United States and the Soviet Union. That paradigm is disappearing and is arguably already dead. The European powers, confronted with the reality of their “soft power” approach, have lost any meaningful influence. Russia, after a decades long de facto absence from the region, is making a comeback but with a very different footprint and much more narrow interests.

The US is withdrawing militarily and disengaging diplomatically. China, though slowly increasing its involvement in the region, is still lacking the means to project its power and has purely economic interests. This situation creates a power vacuum where the regional players must fend for themselves, giving the participants the first opportunity in a few hundred years to chart their own destiny independent of the imperial ambitions.

That is not to say that a bitter power struggle has completely left the region. On the contrary, the powers vying for supremacy are local to the area. These are Iran, Turkey and Israel. The first two are attempting to reestablish their lost empires and project their influence well above the current borders. Israel’s goal, as a relative newcomer to the region, is to maintain its economic and military supremacy as the guarantors of its existence. The power play of the New Middle East is around those three countries. Thus the alliances being created are about nothing but those states and their respective interests.

The Abraham Accords are one such alliance of some Sunni Arab states and Israel against Iran. The accords are an unprecedented diplomatic breakthrough. It is not an old-style 20th century peace agreement forced down the throat of the participants by the big powers and primarily driven by financial and geopolitical incentives. The Abraham Accords, unlike their predecessors, serve genuine long term strategic needs of all signatories. They address military, economic and cultural aspirations of the sides in a mutually satisfactory and beneficial manner. They do serve a clearly defined purpose and may change over time assuming the main threat underlying them is gone or drastically diminished. Yet they are not dependent on big power plays or changes in the White House. Those days are gone.

However, the Abraham Accords are far from being the only attempt at forging alliances in the region, though it is so far the only one uniting stable prosperous countries in their fight for stability and economic development. Iran, with the expansionist goal of extending its hegemony over the vast area populated by Shia Muslims and in some ways recreating the Persian Empire, has created a united front of insurgent movements from Yemen to Lebanon.

THE PARTICIPANTS are a very dynamic force of willing fighters, a very destabilizing and potent force even by Middle Eastern standards. Its weakness is Iran as the only source of financial support. Iran is acting in a way very similar to the strategy that the Soviet Union employed at the height of the Cold War. It is financing an array of terrorist movements capable of inflicting immense damage, but not strong or populous enough to seize power on their own. Finally Turkey is building an alliance of “leftovers’’, of the most politically weak, such as the Tripoli government in Libya and a few rebel groups in Syria. From the “Sick Man of Europe,’’ Turkey has transformed itself into the “Sick Alliance of the Middle East.’’

However, Israel is not limiting its alliances exclusively to the countries of the region. The EU is experiencing a power vacuum not dissimilar to the one in the Middle East. The US is losing its interest in the continent and the EU is lacking a unified foreign policy and military force. The COVID crisis has underscored Brussels’ futile attempts at centralized planning and has deepened cracks in the political union. The agreement between Israel, Austria and Denmark to cooperate in the development and production of the future generation of coronavirus vaccines is the beginning of the pattern of local alliances extending beyond regions. Smaller EU countries are looking at ways to reduce their dependence on Brussels and acquire security expertise for the circumstances not too dissimilar to Israel’s.