The documents, which are multiple pages long and also include minutes of meetings and numerous images that Hamas had collected of Israeli targets, illustrate how advanced the Hamas planning became by 2022. It also illustrates how Hamas was thinking in terms of several different types of attacks. It is unclear how far Hamas progressed in some of the plans. Lastly, the documents appear to illustrate that Hamas was deeply invested in coordinating with Iran, and Hezbollah and informed its Doha-based leadership.

 The reports on these documents raise numerous questions.

The Jericho Wall plan

Hamas’s plans go back many years, this was already known. In fact, Israel had obtained hints of this plan, dubbed the “Jericho Wall” plan – which was known to Israel prior to October 7.

Israeli officials dismissed this plan and also dismissed warnings from IDF women observers about Hamas preparations, but the fact is that aspects of the Hamas plan were known.

The new evidence sheds light on how Hamas seems to have been sharing this plan a lot before the attack. This raises questions about why regional intelligence agencies and also Western intelligence agencies didn’t pick up on it.

Iran has denied prior knowledge of the plan in the past. In addition, reports have sought to claim that the Hamas leadership in Doha did not know about the genocidal attack.

Doha had told Israel prior to October 7 that Hamas only wanted cash and was deterred. If Hamas leaders in Doha knew, then it raises questions about why Qatar, a US ally, didn’t know about the plan. If Doha did know then it raises concerning questions about why Israel wasn’t informed.

Hamas leaders seemed to know about this plan, outside of a small circle. The reports indicate Khalil al-Hayya, a Hamas member knew about it. Hayya met with top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohammed Said Izadi in Lebanon. The fact that Hamas was holding meetings with the IRGC and this didn’t set off any alarm bells seems to be concerning. Other key Hamas members who were in on the plan included Yahya Sinwar, Sinwar’s brother Mohammed, Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa. Issa and Deif have been killed in the war.

Hamas’s plans progressed from its demands for support from Iran that were made in June 2021, right after the ten-day conflict that year, through April and November 2022. The steam kept building through August 2023. Hamas wanted calm to cover up its plans. It succeeded in obtaining this. Israel was distracted by elections in 2022 as well as Hezbollah threats which forced Israel into a US-brokered maritime deal with Lebanon. Israel was also distracted with internal domestic politics in 2023, as well as a rising terror wave in the West Bank.

What we know now

Overall, the new documents tell us a few things. It tells us that Hamas did try to coordinate with the IRGC in Iran and with Hezbollah.

Iran likely coordinated with militias in Iraq and Yemen to prepare for the “big project,” as Hamas called the lead-up to the war. Ismail Haniyeh in Doha knew of the plans. Ismail Qaani, head of the Quds Force of the IRGC, knew of the plans.

However, other aspects of these documents raise questions. Hamas was planning the October 7 operation for years. It also apparently thought up other plans such as major attacks in Tel Aviv. How far advanced were those plans? This question leaves one wondering about Hamas’ overall planning process.

The fact Hamas kept minutes of the meetings and put them on a computer as well as having Hamas members speak with Hezbollah and the IRGC in meetings seems to make one question Hamas’ operational security.

Storing the minutes of a secret terrorist meeting and plans on a computer is a sure way for those plans to be found, unless the computer is never hooked up to the internet or a network. All of this leaves questions about why no other governments in the region were more keyed into the Hamas plans.

While it stands to reason many governments don’t monitor Hamas communications, some of them do monitor Hezbollah or the IRGC. In addition, Hamas leaders reside in Doha, a US ally.

The discovery of Hamas’s plans, which were apparently found back in January in Khan Yunis, the home town of Yahya Sinwar, leave many questions about October 7 unanswered: What it does tell us is that Hamas wanted close coordination with Iran?

It was always assumed that Iran was pushing the multi-front war and unification of the “arenas” to surround Israel.

Hamas is now portrayed as a more senior partner than in the past. Hamas drove Hezbollah towards war with Israel. That is important and shows why many countries should have paid closer attention to the rising Hamas danger.

The documents also make it look increasingly like the Great Return March protests in 2018 and the 2021 short conflict were dry-runs for the October 7 attack.

It also raises questions about whether the maritime deal in which Israel was pushed to appease Hezbollah, helped make Hamas think Israel was weak.

The desire to derail normalization with Saudi Arabia and to attack Israel before new laser air defenses were rolled out also apparently played into Hamas thinking and timing.